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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to consider

Plaintiffs1 claims regarding the illegality of Defendants1 conduct?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs'

appeal of the trial courts1 denial of Plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend
the Pleading to Conform to the Evidence and for a new trial on the
issues of mistake and illegality?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs1

appeal on the issue of whether the trial judge improperly based his
decision on his physical inspection of the property at or around
the time of trial where the appearance of the property at that time
differed greatly from its appearance at the time the alleged
misrepresentations occurred?

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990)
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990)
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990)
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990)
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990)

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are appealing the Court of Appeals1

Order of

Affirmance, in which it affirmed: (1) the trial court's judgment
awarding damages to Defendants for Plaintiffs' default in payments
to

Defendants

on

a

Promissory

Note, allowing

Defendants

to

judicially foreclose on the Trust Deed securing such payments, and
denying Plaintiff's claims for relief; and (2) the trial court's
subsequent denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and to
amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence.
In March

1979, Defendants Martin

S.

and

Reva

S. Ovard

purchased two one-acre lots, a "front" lot and a "back" lot, from
Layne Newman.

(Trial Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") 58, Trial

Exhibits (hereinafter "Ex.") 12-D and 13-D). The transactions were
executed by two separate trust deeds, each covering one acre, (Tr.
222).

The two lots were purchased for a total of $58,000 and were

closed at separate times (Tr. 206-07, 215, Ex. 21-D).
The lots were part of a subdivision plan of Mr. Newman,
encompassing five one-acre lots just north of 650 East 13800 South,
Draper, Utah (Tr. 58, 61, 206). However, the subdivision plan was
not approved by the City of Draper (Tr. 60). As a consequence, a
variance was applied for and granted by the City of Draper so that
the Ovard's could build a home on the front lot (Tr. 60-61, Ex. 7P) . The Ovardfs request was accompanied by a map showing both lots
(Tr. 61, Ex. 6-P) . The Ovard's then built a home on the front lot,
intending to live there (Tr. 64-65).

Before they could move in,

the Ovard's ran into financial trouble and sold the house and the
2

front lot to a Mr. Nipco (Tr. 66) . The Ovard's also received money
from Mr. Ovard's parents, Defendants Ben and Helen Ovard, and put
Ben and Helen Ovard's name on the deed to the back acre so that
they could recover their money by sale of the lot (Tr. 65-66, 216) .
Mr. Nipco subsequently ran into financial troubles and sold the
house and the front acre to Plaintiffs in July 1982 (Tr. 67, 151).
In April 1982, Defendants Ovard decided to list the back acre
for sale with Alan Whipple, a realtor (Tr. 224) .

In September

1982, Plaintiffs noticed activity on the back acre and concluded
that it might be sold (Tr. 152). Plaintiffs feared that someone
would buy the lot, build on it, and obstruct Plaintiffs1 view from,
and enjoyment of, their property (Tr. 153).

Plaintiffs did not

want anyone to build on the back acre (Tr. 119-120, 185) , and
contacted their own realtor, Fred Hale, to discuss buying the
adjoining back lot in order to prevent someone from building on it
(Tr. 153, 155). Mr. Hale and Plaintiffs then prepared an offer of
purchase,

and

Mr.

Hale

subsequently

presented

the

offer

to

Defendants (Tr. 120).
On September 18, 1982, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into
an Earnest Money Agreement, pursuant to which Defendants agreed to
sell and Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the back acre for $26,000
(R. 201) . On November 8, 1982, Plaintiffs delivered and Defendants
received and recorded a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Note") in the
amount of $25,900, with interest at 15% per annum payable on
January

15, 1984, and

$25,900

principal, plus

interest, payable on November 15, 1985 (R. 201).
3

then

accrued

Prior to closing of the sale between Plaintiffs and Defendants, Plaintiffs did not request and Defendants did not offer
information concerning a variance on the property or the validity
of the subdivision map

(R. 202).

Subsequent to the closing,

Plaintiffs learned that the back lot would require a variance,
similar to the variance previously granted to Defendants, before
the City of Draper would issue a building permit on the back lot
(Tr. 168).
Plaintiffs1 only payment to Defendants under the Note has been
an interest payment of $5000 made on March 1, 1984 (R. 202) .
Plaintiffs did not make the balloon payment that was due on January
15, 1985, and stated that they would not pay it (R. 202, Tr. 213).
Defendants then attempted a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure,
which was enjoined by Plaintiffs (R. 203).
Plaintiffs filed this fraud * action in Third District: court:
and Defendants counterclaimed to foreclose the Trust Deed.

The

matter was tried on October 26 and 27, 1987, before the Honorable
Frank G. Noel.

During the course of the trial, Plaintiffs moved

to amend their pleadings to conform to what they claimed was
evidence of mutual mistake of fact (Tr. 200), which was a claim and
issue not contained in Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 2-18).

The Court

reserved ruling on this motion (Tr. 204). Plaintiffs did not renew
this motion during the remainder of or at the end of trial.

4

At the close of trial, the trial judge asked if either party
objected if he went and viewed the property.

Both counsel for

Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants stated they had no
objection

(Tr. 264) .

Judge Noel then took the matter under

advisement (Tr. 264) .
On December 4, 1987, the court issued a memorandum opinion,
finding in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim, and finding
no cause of action on Plaintiffs1 claim (R. 142-43).

Plaintiffs

thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings
to

Conform

to

the

Evidence, this time

to

assert

claims of

illegality and unilateral mistake (R. 216-217, 227-229).

These

motions were denied (R. 256), and Plaintiffs appealed.
On March 14, 1990, counsel for the parties presented oral
argument to a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals.

A decision was

rendered that same day, denying Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs now
seek a Writ of Certiorari and review of that decision.
REASONS WHY THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED
I.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 46, UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FOR THE GRANTING OF
PLAINTIFFS1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Plaintiffs assert that this Court should exercise jurisdiction
to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That Rule lists
four reasons for granting a Writ of Certiorari which, "while
neither controlling
discretion,
considered."

indicate

nor wholly measuring
the

character

Those reasons include:
5

of

the Supreme Court's

reasons

that

will

be

(a)
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue
of law;
(b)
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a way that
is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(c)
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has
so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as
to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision; or
(d)
When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme
Court.
None of these reasons exist in Plaintiffs' Petition.

As the

following arguments illustrate, the trial court's decisions are
completely consistent with Utah statutory and case law.

There is

no

Appeals'

conflict

between

the

trial

court's

or

Court

of

decisions, as compared with other decisions rendered by this Court
or by the Court of Appeals, or with the laws of the State of Utah.
Nor

are

there

any

Plaintiffs' Petition.

special

and

important

reasons

to

grant

The Court of Appeals recognized this, in

light of its disposition of this case the same day that it was
heard, pursuant to a Rule 31, Utah R. App. P., proceeding.
For these reasons, the requirements of Rule 46 are not met,
and

this

Court

must

deny

Plaintiff's

Certiorari.

6

Petition

for

Writ

of

II.

THE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS1 ALLEGED
ILLEGALITY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OF
THE TRIAL COURT AND A NEW TRIAL.

To avoid a contractual obligation by claiming illegality, an
appellant must show clearly and unequivocally that the contract is
illegal.

Mitchell v. American Savings and Loan Association, 593

P.2d 692, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).

Plaintiffs cannot show that

the contract between Plaintiffs and Defendants was illegal, and
have misconstrued the application of the illegality defense.
The

illegality

defense

applies

to

contracts

which

are

themselves prohibited by law or contrary to public policy.

See

Williams v. Continental Life and Accident Co., 593 P.2d 708 (Idaho
1979); Greer v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 674 P.2d 1257
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

Plaintiffs have argued that the contract

in question is itself prohibited by law or contrary to public
policy, and cite two statutes to that effect. This argument fails
for several reasons.
First, Defendants1 basic premise of illegality, i.e., the
illegal division of land, is unfounded, as the record clearly shows
that the land was divided into two one-acre parcels when Defendants
initially purchased the land (Tr. 58, 222; Ex. 12-D and 13-D).
Defendants merely sold the land to Plaintiffs in the same manner
that they had bought it, unaware that such a transaction might be
called "illegal."
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Second, Plaintiffs cite §§ 57-5-3, -5 and 10-9-26, Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended) , in an attempt to show that the sale of land
by

Defendants

to

Plaintiffs

was

illegal, thereby

subjecting

Defendants to civil liability. This Court addressed that argument
in Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962).

There, faced with

facts surprisingly similar to those in the present case, the Court
stated as follows:
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants, in selling the
lots, violated the provisions of ... our state
statutes.... [citing§ 57-5-5, U.C.A. 1953] However, the
laws here have as their object the intelligent and
orderly development of the community, and, to effectuate
this purpose, criminal sanctions were imposed. They were
not enacted to promote safety, and they do not attempt
to lay down rules regulating the conduct of individuals
inter se. Their purpose is to impose a duty running to
the sovereign, and a violation thereof does not
necessarily give rise to civil liability.
Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
Based on the reasoning in Kale, Luis Court should not allow
Plaintiffs to attack their contract based on an alleged violation
of state statutes by Defendants, when, even assuming

such a

violation, it does not give rise to civil liability.
Third, Plaintiffs must convince this Court to allow them to
raise the issues of illegality for the first time on appeal, since
they did not raise them in their Complaint, and the trial court did
not allow such issues to be heard.

Plaintiffs cite two cases in

other jurisdictions, which state that when an important public
policy is concerned, illegality may be raised for the first time
on appeal.

See

Mitchell and Greer, supra.

8

An important public policy does not exist in this case to
allow Plaintiffs to raise the issue of illegality-

This Court in

Hale recognized that, by stating that a violation of the "lot"
statutes did not give rise to civil liability.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION TO
AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT
BE DISTURBED

When issues not formally raised in the pleadings are tried by
the express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 15(b)") allows the
amendment of the pleadings.

That the issue has been tried by the

consent of the parties must be evident from the record.

Colman v.

Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
Further, it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence
was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue."
a.

Xd. at 785.

The trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion
was within the sound discretion of the court.

This court has stated that there is a mandatory requirement
to allow a party to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence
when issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties.

Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753

P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

However, the question of

whether the issues have been sufficiently tried, and thus the
ultimate decision as to whether the amendment should be allowed,
remains in the sound discretion of the court. Stratford v. Morgan,
689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange,
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983).

Implied consent to try an issue may be

found where there is no objection to introduction of supporting
9

evidence by an opposing party, and where it appears that the
opposing party understood that such evidence was aimed at an
unpleaded issue.

In any event, the opposing party must have had

a fair opportunity to defend and introduce evidence.

See Colman,

supra at 785.
In the present case, Plaintiffs have not shown that the denial
of the Rule 15(b) motion was a clear abuse of discretion.

To do

so, Plaintiffs have to show that they sufficiently tried the issues
of illegality and mistake.
they have done so.

Plaintiffs cite Colman to show that

However, the issue in Colman, that of alter

ego, was "fully tried," and evidence concerning "every element" was
introduced without objection.

Colman, supra at 785.

Any claimed evidence of illegality or unilateral mistake
introduced by Plaintiffs in the instant case would also support
Plaintiffs' claim of fraud. Plaintiffs1 counsel even acknowledged
and argued such fact with respect to mistake (Tr. 241-243).
The mere introduction of claimed evidence of mistake did not
therefore place Defendants on notice that it was aimed at unpleaded
issues of mistake as is required by Colman, supra.

The motion of

Plaintiffs1 counsel at trial (Tr. 200-204) to amend their pleading
to assert mistake was the first act that could be argued to have
placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs were asserting or
relying on a claim of mistake. Defendants immediately objected to
such motion (Tr. 200) .
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Any

introduction

by

Plaintiffs

of

claimed

evidence

of

illegality likewise supported Plaintiffs1 claims of fraud and did
not place Defendants on notice that such evidence was aimed at a
claim of illegality.

Plaintiffs did not move to amend their

pleadings to assert illegality during trial when such a motion was
made as to mistake (Tr. 200-204), but such motion was made after
trial and after judgment had been entered (R. 210-214, 216-17).
Because Defendants were without notice that Plaintiffs were
introducing evidence aimed at mistake and illegality at the time
that the alleged evidence of such theories was introduced, any
alleged trial of such issues was not with actual or implied consent
of Defendants and was inadvertent.
have fair opportunity to defend.

Defendants did not therefore
This was so, especially with

respect to the motion on illegality which was not made until after
trial and after formal judgment was entered.

Plaintiffs have

therefore not satisfied the requirements set forth in Colman.
b.

Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead illegality.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a party must affirmatively set forth the affirmative defense of
illegality.

In their Petition, Plaintiffs point to page 60 of the

Trial Transcript to support their argument that illegality was
sufficiently raised at trial.
5) .

(Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

However, there is nothing on that page or in any section of

the record which states that Defendants1 actions were illegal.
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At trial, Plaintiffs merely alleged that Defendants1 division
of the land is subject to land use regulations (Tr. 17, 19 & 23).
The only time at trial where illegality was conceivably argued
concerns arguments of counsel during an objection at trial (Tr.
175, 178-79).

However, these sections of the Trial Transcript are

not evidence and cannot be considered

in determining whether

Plaintiffs pleaded illegality.
The defense of illegality does not apply to this case.

Even

if this court finds that it does, Plaintiffs did not sufficiently
plead it at trial.
c.

Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead mistake.

When Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, they argued
that a mutual mistake of fact had been made, and attempted to
support that allegation (Brief of Appellants, p. 9 ) . Plaintiffs
again raise that argument in their Petition, but this time fail to
support it at all (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 7 ) .
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"all averments of . . . mistake shall be stated with particularity."
The nature of mistake ultimately relied upon by Plaintiffs is
unilateral mistake (R. 227-229), and their brief focuses only on
the mistake of Plaintiff Joseph Sanders.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the elements that must be
established under unilateral mistake:
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that
to enforce the contract as actually made would be
unconscionable.
(2) The matter as to which mistake was made must relate
to a material feature of the contract.
12

(3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake.
(4) It must be possible to give relief •.. without
serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of
his bargain. In other words, it must put him in statu
[sic] quo.
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted).
Using the same analysis as the Briggs court, even if Plaintiffs1 evidence is viewed favorably to them, it is still deficient
as to at least one element, i.e. , the exercise of ordinary diligence.

Id.

The trial court concluded that "Plaintiffs failed to

exercise due diligence at the time of purchase to determine the
status of the Property," and that "under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted that
there may be access problems . .. that should have been investigated."

(R. 205-06)

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their

burden of sufficiently pleading unilateral mistake.
d.

Plaintiffs have not marshalled the evidence, but rather
have only recited the facts that favor their side.

Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an "appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial courtfs findings
are so lacking in support as to be x against the clear weight of the
evidence,1 thus making them xclearly erroneous.1"

In re Estate of

Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
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In Bartell. a widowed spouse

appealed from a finding that she had been omitted from her deceased
husband's will.

As in Bartell, Plaintiffs in this case have

not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings, nor [have they] attempted to
demonstrate that the trial court's findings are against
the clear weight of the evidence, as required by Walker.
Instead, [they] have essentially reargued the factual
case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light
most favorable to [their] case and largely ignoring the
evidence supportive of the trial court's findings.
Id.
Because the question of whether Plaintiffs sufficiently plead
the issues of mistake and illegality is a question of fact, and
because Plaintiffs did not marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, this Court must "rely heavily on the
presumption

of

correctness

that

findings," and affirm its judgment.
IV.

attends

[the trial

court's]

Id.

THE TRIAL COURT'S VIEWING OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS
PROPER.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial judge erred in viewing the
property in dispute because, in doing so, he relied on extrinsic
evidence gathered at the viewing to find in favor of Defendants.
Plaintiffs' contention is based on conjecture and speculation and
is without merit, as they have read misguided and unsupported
interpretations into the trial judge's conclusions of law.
A decision by the court to view the property in a dispute
rests within the sound discretion of the court.
Corp., 381 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1977).

0'Connor v. Dory

The purpose of such a viewing

"is to assist in interpreting and resolving differences in evidence," rather than to supply evidence totally lacking.
14

Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore. 272 P. 2d 176, 177 (Utah
1954) . At trial in this case, conflicting evidence was presented
as to whether a cul-de-sac existed at the time Defendants purchased
the property in dispute (Tr. 62, 172). Plaintiffs allege that no
cul-de-sac existed at the time they purchased the property, and
that the conditions of the property have changed dramatically since
that time.

However, the Affidavits of neighboring residents

submitted by Defendants state that the area is virtually identical
now to what it was at the time the Plaintiffs purchased the
property

(R. 238-39, 242-44).

The only changes have been the

installation of a cement gutter around the cul-de-sac, not to
define the cul-de-sac, but to control water run-off; the planting
of shrubs and plants on private property near the cul-de-sac; and
the installation of a cement wall on the front of private property
which adjoins the cul-de-sac (R. 239, 243-44) .

None of these

changes have caused the property to change dramatically in appearance.
After viewing the property at the conclusion of the trial, the
trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion that:
after having viewed the property, that due to the
location of the property, the road leading from the main
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a
cal-de-sac [sic], and under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted
that there may be access problems associated with the
back parcel that should be investigated.
(R. 142-43, 205-06).

Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these

factors considered by the trial judge did not exist at the time
they purchased the property in question.
15

The Colorado Court of Appeals has dealt with this issue in a
similar case.

In Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188

(Colo. Ct. App. 1981), there was a dispute as to whether a house
had been negligently constructed.

Defendants contended that the

trial court had erred in allegedly basing one of its findings in
part on its viewing of the premises. The trial court had announced
at the end of trial that it wished to view the property and
received no objection from counsel. In finding for the plaintiff,
the trial court stated, "This [the finding for the Plaintiff] is
apparent both from the topographical map [introduced into evidence
by defendants] and from a view of the premises which the court made
. . . .If

Id. at 190 (quoting trial court).

The court of appeals

stated that under these circumstances, defendants1 argument was
without merit.

Id. (citations omitted).

Defendants are merely speculaLing when they allege that the
trial court relied heavily on his viewing. The trial court in fact
dispelled that notion in its Order Denying Motions for New Trial
and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, when it
stated that its viewing of the property in question was not of
primary importance to its decision (R. 255-256).

Even if it did

put some reliance on the viewing, its reliance was proper, as it
was only to assist in resolving differences in the evidence already
presented.
Finally, the trial court's viewing of the property was agreed
to by both Plaintiffs and Defendants

(Tr. 264) .

After such

agreement and failure to object to the viewing prior to its
16

occurrence, and after being given the opportunity by the trial
court to object, Plaintiffs1

later objection is precluded and

without merit.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
The promissory note sued upon by Defendants provides for
attorney's fees to Defendants upon default by Plaintiffs in payment
of the same (Exhe 2-P) .

Defendants should therefore be awarded

attorney's fees and costs on this appeal, with the amount thereof
to be determined by the trial court upon remand for that purpose.
In addition, if this Court refuses to grant Plaintiffs'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defendants should be granted their
costs in opposing Plaintiffs' Petition, pursuant to Rule 34, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Defendants ask this court to deny Plaintiff's Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs have not
met any of the requirements of Rule 46, Utah R. App. P.

Second,

the evidence on the issue of defendants' alleged illegality was not
sufficient to justify a reversal of the trial court and a new
trial,

nor does

liability.

such

alleged

illegality

give

rise to civil

Third, the trial court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs

to amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence was within the
court's discretion, as Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead
illegality or mistake, and Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the
evidence to show otherwise. Finally, the trial court's viewing of

17

the property in dispute was proper, and its subsequent decision was
based on evidence in the record.
WHEREFORE, Defendants ask that this Court deny Plaintiffs1
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and award Defendants their fees
and costs in opposing the same,
DATED this / W o day of May, 1990.
CROWTHER & REED

'Thomas N. Crowther
/
/

Michael L. Labertew
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE UF bhKVlCE
Four copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Writ of
Certiorari were mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
to Plaintiffs1 Attorney, Frederick N. Green, at GREEN & BERRY, 528
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this

~< day of May, 1990.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

lifer C *„.»** -

Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M.
Sanders,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Appellants,
Case No. 890063-CA

v.
Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard,
Ben F. Ovard, Helen T. Ovard
and Jax Hayes Pettery,
Defendants and Respondents.

v.
Joseph D. Sanders, Cheryl M.
Sanders; Utah State Tax
Commission; Salt Lake
County; and Insurance Company
of North America,
Counterdefendants•

Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (on Rule 31
Hearing).
The judgment and findings of the trial court are
supported by the evidence and the record before the trial
court.

Also, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to

allow plaintiff's amendment.
The judgment is affirmed.

Dated~this
/
FOR THE

/ y ^ f f a y of March, 1990.

/

COURT:;
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Ronald Dean Lancaster, pro se.
der when the prosecution was unable to
David L WilkiQSOii, Kimberfy Honuk, prove the aggnvating circumstaaces with
Salt Lake Qty, for defendants ud rtspon- which hehad been charged. In his habeta
:~u
corpus petiticm, plaintiff a^ears to allege
PERCURIAlt
tionai murder^ ud that he should han
Plaintiff M,h propria permi, a pe- h o sentenced to one to fifteen jetf
tition for poateonviction relief in the trial imprisonment mstead offiveyears to fife,
court with respect to his guilty plea to and Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of
subsequent conviction of second degree knowingly and intentionally committing; tie
murder. I k trial court dismissed the peti- offense and was therefore unlawfully &
tin as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not prisoned and that he had been denied doe
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty process and effective assistance of coonseL
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65Bfaaddition, plaintiff challenged the cooatj.
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was tutionality of the statutes under which he
therefore not permissible. We reverse and was charged and sentenced.
n^fe.Mittp.th..* m cm to mW ***<!«
In response to plaintiffi petition, the habeas conras is not a sofotitDte for sad
State brought a motion to dismiss on the o u ^ ^ ued to perform tite fimetiim of
ground that ander the rationale of Stofe u rep]ir appellate review. Porter uCboi
m m M M J |309 {Utah 1987), plain- w P „ , 1032 (Utah 1987); o S
Jff was precludedfinbanging i motion ntMmkm
m m m
m
for postconviction reiief unl be had first , „ - , , ,
« .,, ^ 0(U „M
. *";. , , , . . . , , . 18ft Martina v. SimtA, 602 Pid 70a
brought a motion to set aside bis p t y 7Q2/nt«h 1979) Bt'thuahoreflmHtt]
IW
plea. He trial court adopted that rationale , } . . . .
P«i
• u. -1 J J . _* / t v
uat review by habew « r p B appropr*.
ai its oroer deoTinr writ of habeas conwa, t .
.'.
*™V
and-theStaterepeata it before Uus Courts
*M^ma?miomui*
cbalknpgtl«nrtofplaintiffshat«as ^taltoessandtoreexanmacc*
corpus petition.
vrton when the nature of the afleged error
„ ts sach that it would be uncoosdonible oot
S^ R «^inappositehere.Gib. toMBaBta: ChaSw^eUPJirtlllS
bona pleaded g^r to several charges and ^ ^ ^ .% ^ j ^
toappeaW irec/y after the tml court over(rale65B<i)oftheUtlllRakjof(H
U a M t a t o c M t a i | C produre specifically
provides that a («•
his
thi'did
StatenotarguedlatS
institute.,,,.
a pn^
imprisonment
file a motion to constotwiiil
. r nghU
. ,my, ..,,
rappeal and He
who tmder
assertsthis
a substantial
his
Court should decline to conaider the gui2t7 oner
ceeding
rule." Seedenial
abo of^
plea issue because it was not raised below, J ^ ^ ^ ^ where tlus Court
740 P.2d at 131L This Court declined to ^ a petiton for habeas corpus revm
follow the State's request and remanded ble without fi«t requinng the withdrawal
thecasetoeiiabteGabonstofikaiiwtion of a guilty plea. Given the allegations
to withdraw his guilty p]ea, retaining juris- plaintiff made ui his petition, it was there^
diction over the case for further action, fore error for the trial court to dismiss the
Stok* GibbmMMtwmtolicoU P ^ 0 wiBwtt ^ a hearin*
ml attack on the guilty plea.
Without the benefit offindings,this
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post* Court is in no position to review the ralidh
conviction petite to challenge the vahdity ty of plaintiffs claims. It is safe to s*
of his guilty piea some nine years after the some that trial courts prefer to give shof^
time for a direct appeal had run. Itap- shrift to the many post-conviction petitiaa
pearsfromhis handwritt^i pleadings that which they decide lack merit ItisequaSy
he was originally charged withfirstdegree safe to assume that an appellate court w i
murder, but pleaded to second degree mar* be unable to review the case in a vacuum]

Vttt ffl

and will have to remand it where no ratio- was not precludedfromseeking reformssale for dismissal or denial is given. Atinof commission schedule under coosiinple finding, on the other hand, will suf- trac^ and (3) middleman was not entitled
fee in the vast majority of cases to limit to recover costs of deposing two witnesses
the judicial process to one review. lie and serving subpoena on one witness.
tiial cotfflfs basis for dsmissinsr plaintiffs
Vacated and remanded
petition in this ca» was erroneous, as stattd The rmci'ss too qmeJor this Oivt
to determine whethe the issues raised by I Pleading **UKi)
tbe pleadings were legal, so that it could
In breach of contract action in which
affirm the trial court on the ground that miifanan who sold "coffee eitaykfi^
the daims were properly resolved as a mat- act" for supplier sought torecovercommater of law. See Gmla t Morris 610 ska under contract with supplier, trial
PJd 1285,1286 (Utah 1980). Instead, it court erred in denying mjddkman^ motioa
appears that piaintiff claims irreguJarity ic to amend to include cause of action for
thereceptionof his guilty plea, an issue reformation of contract so the commission
M should have been considered by the schedules could be changed; issue of co&
trial court
mission schedules wuiwt raised and sec*
Tie case isremandedfor entry of find- ** 1q it tM id art Sirttin
ings on the merits.
middleoan to submit evidence <m issue <^
parties' intent in entering contract
(p {ffrwwmw)

1 Reformation of Instruments o t t
Middleman who sold "coffee extendi
product" for supplier was not precluded
from seekingreformationof commission
schedule under contract with supplier because contract included iuiegfttiou clause.

LLOYD'S UNUMITED, a corporation, 1 ^formation of Instruments *=»]),
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(81)
Reformation of contract is equitable
r<
NATURE? WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
ity and established by clear and convincing
a corporation, Defendant and
proof.
Respondent
NtMHUU
4. Costs ^176,193
In middleman's action against supplier
Court of Appeals of Utah.
to recover commissions under contract witii
supplier, middleman waa not entitled to reApril 21f 1988.
cover costs of deposing two witnesses id
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules
Middleman brought action for breach Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d).
of contract against supplier, seeicing ac- j ^ t f l j
counting and judgment for sums due under
„ . ,. , ^. XL .
« * TT« IT^ District Court, Salt . ^ * T * " * ! ? * * rf
Ufa County, Dean I Conder, J., entered J * ^ * S " ^
jndpenttofavorofanppiier.ando.iddle. ^ ^ T T ^ " 1 " 1
.»«*.
H»e Court of Appeals, ^
t
^
T
^

W i J, held that (1) JZ

1
T
^?/
m
m i m

emd in denying middleman's motioa to
>
Wnd to include cause of action (or refer- 6. Appeal and Error «998K1)
•ttion of contract so the commission frial court's man*; on whether to
«feedaie9 eonid be changed,- (2? zniddfeman sward party tbe costs 0/depositwof is pre-
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which stated that Lloyd's would receive
$100 commission for each pound of prod.
uctsold. On August 11,1982, after Dot.
die and Burningham discussed the do*
anient, Dowdle crossed out the commasiQQ
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), Leslie W. new schedule in the handwritten contract
Slaagh, Ray& Uartineaa, RC, Provo, for which, as found by the trial court, prorided
plaintiff and appelant
the following commission schedule:
.25*
Terry E (Min (argued), H Wayne 1 unit—60 packets pack
1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack
it
1
uniW
lb.
bulk
pack
50*
(or defendant and respondent
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack $100
The parties then signed the agreemott
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
Several days later, Dowdle's secretary
and BENCH, A
typed the agreement from the handwritten
version. The typewritten agreement set
OPINION
forth thf same commission schedule as set
GREENWOOD, Judge:
out above except the commission on the 6
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), ini- lb. bulk pack was Sk rather than 50t
tiated this action against defendant, Na- The typewritten agreement also repeated
ture's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's verbatim the following clause from the
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an handwritten agreement "This agreement
accounting and judgment for sums due un- contains the entire understanding of the
der the contract The court found that the parties hereto and may not be altered,
parties had entered into a valid and, en- amended, modified, or discharged in any
forceable contract and awarded Lloyd's way whatsoever except by subwHrast
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the agreement in writing by all parties hereto,"
court improperly denied its motion to The parties then signed the typewritten
amend the complaint to include a cause of agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's
action for reformation and that the trial $500, representing commission earned from
court's findings of fact were clearly errone- April 24,1982 to August 1,1981 Tie
ous, Lloyd's requests modification of the parties did not make a formal accounting
lower courfs award and entry of judgment of the sizes or amount of the product sold
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Al- to earn the $500 commission.
ternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judg- Between August 1,1982 and February
ment be vacated and the case remanded. 28,1984, Nature's Way received more than
We reverse and remand.
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd'i
FACTS
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action,
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdle (Dowdle), alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burning- that Nature's Way owed it commissioQi
ham (Burningham), president of Nature's based on the following commission schedWay, began negotiating terms of a contract ule:
involving a "coffee extender product" 60 packets pack
$ .25
35
(product). The contract was to provide 2 lb. bulk pack
5
lb.
bulk
pack
JO
that Lloyd's would receive a commission
1.00
from Nature's Way for product sold to37 lb, bulk pact
Yurita Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Na- Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5l
ture's Way in consideration of Lloyd's ef- stated Defendant denies the validity 4
forts in inducing Yurika to purchase and the agreement and therefore denies thj
market the product In early August 1982, allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff^
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document complaint to the effect that defendant is?

sumed correct md will not be disturbed
unless it is so unreaaraable as to manifest
dear abuse of discretion. Rules GY-PTOC,
Rule 54(d).

U
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LLOYD^tflMTEDv. NATURE? WAY

During thefirstday of trial, the parties
addressed, almost exduanrely, the question
of what consideration Lloyd's was to pro*
vide in order to earn the commission
Burningham testified that he expected
Dowdk to do a lot of traveling to proo*
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regarf
to payment of Dowdk's travel expenses,
'That's the reason why I offered the coi
mission. And I offered that—I offered |:
to him because it would have been v*y
lucrative for him."1
On the second day of trial, Burninghaa
E Procedural Background
testified under direct examination as to
border to properly assess the validity of what the contract said, as follows:
the trial court's roiings, we mustfirstpro- Q. What does it state will be payiblt
for one unit of the two-pound bulk
vide a rather detailed description of the
pack?
r of this case.
Hie record reveals that proceedings in A. iScents.
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of Q. i5 cents?
lack of consideration, op until the second A. That's correct
day of trial As stated earlier, Nature's Q. Quarto of a cent, I guess.
Way's answer to the complaint generally
denied liability under the contract, without On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel
specificaily addressing the commission rate began to question Burningham about the
amounts alleged in the complaint Theas- intent of the parties on the commission rati
swer also included an affirmative defense amounts, the trial court sustained Naof lack of consideration.' Prior to trial, ture's Way's objection to such questioning.:
Lloyd'sfileda motion for partial summary After trial, but before the court entered
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of itsfindingsof fact and conclusions of law,
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest The mo- Lloyd'sfileda motion for an order grant*
tion was supported by the affidavit of a ing leave tofilean amended complaint to
conform to the evidence to include a cause
of
the amount due under the contract utilizing action for reformation of the contract
the commission schedule as alleged in the Lloyd's alsofileda post trial memorandum
complaint and invoices of sales made by which included excerpts from the deposiNature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memo- tion of Burningham, as follows:
randum in support of the motion and Q. Had you made commissions to
Lloyd's... you would pay him 35
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again
cents
for each two pound bulk pack!
set forth the same schedule as in the comA.
Correct
plaint Nature's Way's memorandum in
opposition to the motion for summary judg- Q. Based on the 300 figure!
ment states 'Defendant has no objection to A. Correct
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested Q. For the five pound bulk you would
fads other than that important uncontestpay him 50 cents based on the 180
ed facts were omitted" The memorandum
figure!
then sets forth additional "facts" but does
A.
Correct
not mention the commission rate amounts.
He court denied the motion for summary Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidavit
ted dad:

p i points eironeously, as was done on at [1] Consequently, we bold that the tii
lent part of the handwritten agreement court erred in denying the motion to amenf
> Several months after the trial the court to •** *ttMerf* * » for refonnatiosr
^^ifytitovitalk
ofikcontrartwheretheisswof^
fcftmBgrttehandwrito
sion seheduies was not raised ontfl the
tntta ov toe nsftiss nad commission rates
second day of trial sad where the court S t
i fyfyVk, and JL00; the typed JrtaflotUoyd'stosuI^
agreement executed by the parties had issue of tl» parties'intent in entering the
commoskm rates of i5c, i5c t iOcf and contract Because the motion to amend
fLOOj and the intent of the parties with should have been granted, we reverse and
-respect to commissions did not change be- remand for further proceedings on the ref*
tween execution of the two agreements, ormation issue.
Farther, the court found that the parties
had stipulatoitothe amount of pwduct
^
a Mnnation of
sold during the time in question Thecourt
eoaehided that the typed coixtz3ct was a ft fl We farther note that the trial
nfii integrated and enforceable contract « r t * » « * t y W » d t o & * & * &
andentewdjudgmentforl^iTandcosts ten agreement could no^ as a matter of
tfi]$jlt
law, be reformed, because of the intem. ^ J • 1 .L u 4
j prion clause included in the contract1
The court denied the motion to amend l f ,. . . . .
,u
.. A, . . ,
Reformation of a contract is an equitable
t ,
be complaint to include a cause of action remedy which must be pied with particularFor reformation.
ity and established by clear and convincing
C. Application of Law
proof. Brigg$ a LiddeU, 699 Pid 770,772
In this case, when, on the second day of (Utah 1985). He Biijgt court stated:
trial, Burningham first testified that the A contract may bereformedfor either of
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack two reasons. First if the instrument
wss a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney does not embody the intentions of both
Si not object to the testimony on the parties to the contract, a mutual mistake
ground that it was not within the issues has occurred, and reformation is approframed by the pleadings. Therefore, be- priate. Second, if one party is laboring
eaase no objection wu raised, we conchide tinder a mistake about a contract term
that there was implied consent to trying of and that mistake either has been induced
the issui and the first part of Rule 15(b) by the other party or is known by and
applies, allowing omsaderatkui of the issue. conceded to by the other party, then the
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of inequitable nature of the other party's
the issue of commission rates only on the conduct will have the same operable efsecond day of trial, and by the court's fect as a mistake, and reformation is
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find
that it wss an abuse of discretion to con- / i at 771 Reformation has also been a^
comitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to plied in instances of drafter error. "Referthenewlyraisedissue,bythecourfsrefus. mation is clearly appropriate where there is
altoconsiderevidenceofintentanddenial a variance between the written deed and
of the motion to amend the complaint to the true agreement of the parties caused
plead reformation of contract flierewas by a draftsman." Hettinger v.Jme% 684
noevidenaofprejudkewhichwouWre^ P-2d 1271,1273
1984),
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment On remand, the court should allow
would aDow realization of one of the crite- Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can
ria under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the muster to establish its right to reformation
merits of the action."
of the contract Moreover, it is not pre-

510 Utah

infltotheir dispute. What they are ajtitled to is ootice of the issues nised and
in opportunity to nwet tkm. When this
is accomplished, that a 4D that is reqused. Oar rules pnnride for Sberalitj
to aOow ezammaticxi into and setUaaent
of ill issues bearing upon the controve
ay, but safeguard the rights of the otter
party to have a reasonable time to meet a
net issue if he so requests.
Accord William 1 State Fm In & ,
656 Pid 966, « W 1 (Utah 1982).

u u 511

*3

L This tesdmony strikes us 11 incoodstent with
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement

yielded commiisioos of only (41&25 over t v
time period in question.

t l i e court may hive believedreformation was
not available for other reasons, but the ante-

fratkm clause was the only rationale mentioned
by the court
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eluded from doing so by the integration Bank, 521 Pid at 567, Tie Utah S
clause included in tie contract An inte- Court has declined to extend the
which allows recovery of the cost oft
rior or contemporaneous agreements on adepoeitionftoexpensessuchuserTios^
the same subject, bat "does not prevent a subpoena, frampton,605 Pid at T^
poof of fraudulent representations by a
Lloyd's claims that the depositions
party to the contract, <» of illegality, acciBurningham and Webb were essential j
dent, or mistake.... [P]aper and ink posthe development and presentation of tfifj
sess no magic power to cause statements
case and that Webb's deposition was I
of fact to be tone when they are actually
untrue" Cor6tn on Conirodx, § 578 at
would be unavailable to testify at teal j»«
405-07(196(1).
addition, Lloyd's argues that becausep^ 4
tions
1 COSTS
[4-6] Lloyd's also contends that the used at trial, it should be awarded the <
court ared in failing to awird it the costs of Burningham's depositxsL Lloyd's!
of deposing Bnnungham and Webb and contends that it should have be© an
serving a subpom on Burningliam. Utah the costs of serving Burningham with a*
R.GY.P, 54(d) provides that except as the subpoena to insure his appearance at the
rak otherwise provides, "costs shall be al- deposition Nature's Way had previously
lowed as of course to the prevailing party failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to''
unless the court otherwise directs...." compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that
The general rule is that under Utah the subpoena was necessary to secure
M M . 54(d) "costs" means those fees Burningham's appearance at the deposid
wind are '"required to be paid to the court tion.
' t
and to witnesses " fmmpton v. W\l
Nature's Way, to the contrary, argues^
tm, 805 P.2d771, 774 (Utah 1980). Howthat because Lloyd's did not use WebbY'
ever, the Utah Supreme Court has held
deposition at trial and did not publish Bury
that tte expenses of taking depositions are
also allowable as costs if they were reason- ingham's or Webb's deposition at trial, thr
ably necessary. John Price Amc, Inc. v. court properly denied Lloyd's the costs i.
D m 588 Pid 713,715 (Utah 1978). Dep- the deposition. Nature's Way also co*
osition costs are generally allowed as nec- tends that Lloyd's could have avoided thi
essary and reasonable "where the develop- cost of the subpoena by telephoning N»
ment of the case is of such a complex tore's Way's attorney to see if the corpora
nature that discovery cannot be accom- tion would produce Burningham for a depo^
plished through the less expensive method sition, and, therefore, the trial court c *
of interrogatories, requests for admissions rectiy denied Lloyd's the cost incurred ia
and requests for the production of doc- subpoenaing Burningham.
uments.'1 Highland Qmitr. Co. v. Union
We find that, in view of these arg**
Po&lUL, 683 Pid 1042,1051 (Utah 1984).
ments, the trial court's decision to deny
The party claiming entitlement to the costs
Lloyd's the costs of the two deposition
of depositions has the burden of demonwas reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's fsibd
strating that the depositions were reasonto prove that the deposition costs wen
ably necessary and whether that burden is
reasonably necessary and could not be #
met is within the sound discretion of the
trialcourt li; MSecBankofM complished through less expensive meaa^
l U t R W n m 563,567 (Utah Therefore, because the burden of prog
1974). Tie trial court's ruling on whether was not met and because the trial cocrtV
to award a party costs of depositions is decision was reasonable, we hold that Ui
{ffesnmed correct and will not be distnrbed trial court did not abuse its discrtooo^l
jyd's the costs of taking.
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest
3ns.
a dear abuse of discretion Firtt Sec

1

r

ifATCv.STUES

Utah m

e a k hold that the trial court's deci- A^eals held Uiat petition failed to satisfy
to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoena- applicable requirements.
Burningham was not unreasonable, in
Petition denied.
of Frtmpton, where the court deto extend the rules for awarding
ts to exposes such as service Crisninal U w i»l«71
and vacated the trial court's
Petition for certificate of probable
i of su(4 costs. Therefore, we hold cause ladced required affidavit of counsel
0 0 the trial court did not abuse its discre- or memorandum of law supporting defendfain refusing to award Lloyd's the costs anfs position that issues presented on ap|jerving the subpoena,
peal were novel or fairly debatable.
P

t

IIL FINDINGS

ijtfs third claim of error is that the
court's findings are not supported by
# evidence Because we hold that that
£ trial court erred in denying the motion
Baaend, we need not reach the issue of
lather the findings are supported by the
ifldence.

Bradley P. Rich, Yengith, Rich, Xaixi
Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellant
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. G a ,
Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., k
plaintiff and respondent

Before JACKSON, 0RME and
GREENWOOD,
II. (On Law and
Tie judgment of the trial court is vacatid sad the matter remanded for further
jroeeedmgs in accordance with this opinMEMORANDUM DECISION
a
PER CURIAM:
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur.

This matter is before the court os t

Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause
Appellant's counsel filed the petition oo
March 10,1988. It was accompanied by i
brief Memorandum of Points and Authorities, but was not supported by the affidavit
of counselrequiredby State t Ntciq, 707
P,2d 647 (Utah 1985). H e Utah Supreme
Court set forth the rationale for the pro^
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
dure mandated in Nttley as follows:
The record of proceedings below is not
available in this Court at the time such
petitions are brought In addition, the
Dklde Lynn STUKES, Defendant
petitions filed by the defendants are genand Appellant
erally conciusory and contain little information
concerning the case. Ite attorNo. 88Q154-CA,
ney general, who is by lawrequiredto
Court of Appeals of Utah.
argue before this Court, is uninformed
concerning the facts of the case or the
April 22,1988.
proceedings taken in the court below and
therefore finds it difficult to respond to
petitions for certificates of probable
^Following ruling of the Third District cause. This Coart is likewise unp r t , Summit County, PatB, Brian, J., on
| t a k issue, defendant filed petition for argument In order that this Court may
i of probable cause. TheCourtof make an informed decision in i s s u i n g
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PhyUit & COLMANt Plaintiff
tad Respondent,
?,

WUHaalCOLM^Meaiant
iBdAppeBnL

utsma
Court of Appeth <rf Utah.

o<nm
Husband appealed boo order of the
Had District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J^ which dmded property in
connection with divorce, lta Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1) evidence sustained trial court's determination to pierce
corporate veil of husband's corporations,
and (2) distribution was proper.
Affirmed.

operation of the corporate entity, that a *
poraterecordswere not kept, and that the
husband used the corporation and other
corporate shells as a facade for his personal business operations.
tCorporatioa^UlJ)
Corporate veil which protects stockholders from individual fiabifity will be
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously.
S,Corporatk»i«»1.4(4)
To disregard corporate entity under alter ego doctrine, there must be shown such
a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, and it
must be shown that, if the corporate form
were observed, it would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or result in an inequity;
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actual fraud but he must show that a failure to
pierce the corporation veil wouldresultin
an injustice.

i Corporations P\Ml)
Factors which are significant in deter
mining whether corporate veil shouid be
pierced are undercapitalization of a oneman corporation, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends,
siphoning of corporate funds by dominant
stockholder, ixmfunctioning of other offiauthorized by the express or implied con- cers or directors, absence of corporate
sent of the parties must be evident from records, use of corporation as a facade or
operations of the dominant shareholder,
the record
and use of the corporate entity in promofr
1 Divorce ^ t t t
ing injustice or fraud
Although alter ego issue was not specifically raised in pleadings, where entire T. Corporations «*1.«1)
Failure to observe corporate formal
ties,
which may justify pierang corporate
over assets in question, the issue was tried
by the consent of the parties and trial court veil, includes such activities as comment*
properly based its decision on that issue. ment of business without the issuance of
shares, lack of shareholders at directors
I Divorce «53(2)
meetings, lack of signing of assents, and
Finding that corporation was husmaking of decisions by shareholders u if
band's alter ego was supported by evidence
they were partners.
that husband ignored corporate formalities,
that hereferredto the corporation's check- I Corporations * U ( 1 )
Rationale used by courts in permitting
dealt with corporate assets without suggest- corporate veil to be pierced is that, if praei*
ing that he was acting on behalf of anyone pal shareholder or owner conducts his p k
other than himself, that the officers and vate and corporate business on sn intfl^
dmrfATf vkvpA littU t* iw ml* in tta ehMrahk or ioint basis as if thev were ,*.

1. Pleading <*4ff
If theory of recovery is fully tried by
the parties, court may base its decision on
that theory and deem the pleading amended, even if the theory was not originally
pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact,
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one, he is without standing to complain Frank J. Alien, Salt Lake Qty, for dewhen an injured party does the same,
fendant and appellant
I Divorce t t i l M
Bryce Roe, Albert (^Iton, Salt Lake Gty,
Former spouses attempting to shield ^ P^tiff and respondent
assetsfimna court-ordered pn^erty <&tz>
bution by using a corporate form are espe- Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
da&y looked opcm with judicial disfavor. JACKSON.
I t Divorce e t S U
OPINION
Fact that property distribution may
not have been mathematically equal b not
GARFF, Judge:
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse
of discretion, as fair and equitable propaty Defendant/appellant William J. Coiman
(Sstriinition is not necessarily an equal dis- appeals from a property settlement judgtribution.
ment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyilis I Coiman stemming from their 1977
1L Divorce o t t U O )
divorce. He seeks revesal of the judgTrial court did not abuse its discretion ment
is dnridxng property after piercing corporate vai on the grounds that the corpora- The parties were divorced after a twentyfour year childless marriage during which
tion was the husband's alter ego.
they acquired substantial property. On
II Divorce * t t U ( Q
August 2,1977, in anticipation of divorce,
Trial court did not abuse its discretion they executed a written property settlein requiring husband to pay an amount ment agreement Because questions had
representing a percentage of the price of not been resolved as to which assets conproceeds from sate of ranch where he trolled by defendant were part of the m*&
found that husband held an interest in the tal estate, this agreement required him to
ranch.
provide plaintiff with a "complete accounting of all stocks currently owned by him or
11 Estoppel *OH)
in which he [had] any interest," and a
Estoppel arises when there is a false "complete accounting of all royalty intarrepresentation or concealment of material ests currently owned by him or in which he
facts made with knowledge, actual or con- [had] any interest" within one year of the
structive, of the facts to a party who is agreement Once the extent of defendwithout knowledge or the means of lcnowi- ant's holdings was determined, plaintiff
edge of the real facts and made with an was to receive one-half of defendant's inintention that the representation be acted terest in any stocks "held in... [his] name
qon, and the party to whom the represen- or in which he [had] any interest," and
tation was made relies or acts upon it to his one-half of the sales proceeds of the
prejudice.
Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property
located
in Cache County, Utah.
It E s t o p p e l s
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts Much of the dispute between the parties
of which party to be estopped had no centered around defendant'srelationshipto
Owanah Ofl Corpmtxm [Owanah], a closely held corporation winch defendant and
11 Husband and Wife « I K 1 )
Francois de Gonsberg had founded in 1952
Fife was not estopped from denying to engage in o9 and gas exploration. Dethat husband had furnished adequate ac- fendant had served as Owanah1! president
counting u required by their divorce
during much of the parties'marriage. In
igreeoent even though wife's attorney had
1959, Owanah was restructured to generretaroed certain stock certificates which he
ate outside capital As a consequence, de-

tad tana) AW tn +ta«
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twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding ants earlier deposition contradicted this
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff
shares.
At the tine of the divorce, defendant owned M of the Royalty stock. Dealso controlled stock, originally issued in fendant, in his personal financial state*
various names, in other closely held corpo- meats, valued the ranch at between $250,.
rations: Western Oil Shale Corporation, 000 aod 11,000,000.
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Investment Company. Defendant claimed that
most of this stock belonged to Owanah,
was not part of the marital estate, and,
therefore, was not subject to the property
division agreement

In January 1982, Royalty sold the
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and authorized Owanah to use the proceeds. The
only consideration which Royalty received
for the proceeds was its choice between an
interest-bearing loan and a # overriding
royalty
interest in Owanah.
H e Western Oil Shale Company stock
was issued in 1964 in consideration for Defendant also claims that he made an
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leas- oral accounting pursuant to the property
es. Although defendant alleged that none settlement agreement with the law firm
of the parties' personal funds wee expend- Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe
ed to squire these leases, he introduced no and Fowler all stock certificates in the pu^
1
evidence beyond his testimony to that ef- ties safe deposit box. Because plaintiff
fect He also explained that the stock was was not satisfied that there had been an
issued in names other than Owanah's so adequate accounting under the terms of
that Owanah could sell it more easily by the property settlement agreement, she &
avoiding normal corporate fonnaJities, At sally brought this action on May 29,1380,
to compel the accounting and judgment for
the time of trial, he held at least
any damages caused by defendant's delay
al control but admitted ownership cf cnJy in submitting the accounting. The purpose
of the accounting was to identify the
2^S6of them.
Cayman stock had been issued by Cay- amount to which plaintiff was entitled u
man Corporation as consideration for stock her share of the marital estate.
in another closely held corporation, National Oil Shale Corporation, and for an ofl and
gas lease with a producing oil wel De*
fendant testified that both the National Oil
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in
his name for ease in sale and handling, but
that he held them in trust for third parties.
However, he introduced no evidence other
than his testimony that there was an actual
trust relationship between himself and others. Part of the reason for his failure to
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman
and National 00 Shale corporate records.
At the time of trial, defendant held at least
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name.

Hie trial coort agreed that defendant
had not made an adequate accounting, finding that Owanah was defendant's alter ego
even though this issue was not explicitly
raised in the pleadings, l i e court also
found that the assets subject to the accounting were, in fact, owned by defendant, and, pursuant to the terms of the
settlement agreement, that plaintiff was
entitled to one-half of those assets. However, because most of the assets had been
sold by defendant, the court established a
monetary value for the liquidated assets
and included that amount as part of the
marital estate to be distributed between
theparties. Although this was an accounting action, the court ap(»opriately disposedof the assets according to the terms of the
stipulated property settlement agreement
without objection by either party.

At the time of the property settlement
agreement, Royalty Investment Company
owned, as its only major asset, the
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testified that Owanah and two other parties had
made installment payments on the ranch Defendant raises the following issues ofc
and, thus, were entitled to 6 2 ^ of Royal- appeal: (1) Was the a t e ego issue proper
fV« *n+aiMn/4ni/* miiutlr U/M

iJ«~l

W U A M tk* fe^i «mi*+f

/ft Tf fktt «H»-'

ego issue was

before the court, that was tried inadvertently," MBI Motor
was
to, 506 Fid at TIL
court's finding that Owanah was defendconsent to try an issue may be
anfsaitercgo! (3) Does applying the al"where ooe party raises an issue
ter ego doctrine effect a property distribomaterial to the other party's case or wberr
tioo cotitnry to t k parted property distrievidence is introduced without objection,"
botia agreement! (4) Did the evidence,
06, where it aippeu(a} that the putiei
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an
amlentood the erideoee [wis]tobe timed
amount representing a parentage of the
ttthempbdedinK." M Motor ( h
Anderson Ranch sale proceeds! (5) Is
506Fidttm.
fcflntMyM
pbmtzff estopped from denying that de-

of Utah t(Md Fori, Inc^fim

ing!

859,861 (Utah 1379).

Thos, the test for deterwig whether
pleuSngs should be deemed amended unI
der
Utah R.G?J> 15(b)»'whether the.
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of
opposing
party had t fair opportunity to
Gvi Procedure, issues not raised by the
pleadings may be tried by the express or
implied consent of the parties.1 l i e Utah al eTidence if the cue wen retried oa *.
UPoUCuuLC&i.
Supreme Court has observed that issues different theory."
treated as if raised in the
Therefore, "even failure to amend the
pletdiags does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues."
GmrdluCcof
i n . ii Curnicm Dynasty O p , 545 Pid
502,506 (Utah 1976).
[1] If a theory of recovery is fully tried
by the parties, the court may base its decition on that theory and deem the pleadings
amended, even if the theory was not originally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings
or the pretrial order. MBI Motor Ok ft
loto/East, fa, 506 F.2d 709,711 (6th
Gr.1974). However, that the issue has, in
fset, been tried, and that this procedure
has been authorized by express or implied
consent of the parties must be evident from
therecord. (FtrfeftFJLSloan,Inc.,285
P%669,675(WJ).Pil968). "Atrial
court may not base its decision on an issue
I Ottb R.OvJ». 15(b) (1977) reads u follows:
Wbea issues not raised by the pleading ire
tried by express or implied consent of the
pcties, they shall be treated in all respects is
if they had been raised in the pleading*
Sock amendment of the pleadings is maybe
oecesary to cause tbeos to coofbrm to the
evidence u d to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these

Su also Omq t Sucker, 14 Utah 2d
205,381 P-2d 86,91 (1963); ButhnerBbck
O)ift(;^6Utah2d226,310Pid5n,
519-20(19571
(21 In the present case, even though the
alter ego issue was not specifically raisd
in the pleadings, either initially or by
amendment, the entire trial testimony con*
ceraed defendant's control over the assets
in question During trial, evidence concerning every element of the alter ego issue was introduced without objection. Fu>
the?, the basic question raised in an alter
ego case is whether the principal had per*
sonal control over assets which he claimed
to belong to the corporation. Since this
question is the essential issue presented by
this accounting action, we find that the
parties received adequate notice of the at
tar ego issue and an opportunity to meet it
on the ground that it is not within the isaues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended when the p r t »
tatioo of the merits of the actk» will be
subserved thererjy tod the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
sud o i o ^ vaild prqudia him in m a ^
taining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant i continuance, if aecef
ary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
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Here w« no indication in the record that 370,510 Pid 526,528(1973); Geary*
defendant ever represented to the court Cm, 79 Utah 268,9 Pid 396,398 (1932).
that he wis taken by surprise or wis other- It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter actualfraud,hut must wily show that h&>
egossue. SuQmciihdtT^im are to pierce the corporate veil would i*
it 9L Wefind,therefore, that the alter suit in an injustice. Hcdikm-Midiovn
ego issue wis property before the court Conwlaxnt Hotp, 511 FJkpp. it 420.
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed
significant, although not coochsive, in de(Ml There is sufficient evidence to termining whether this test has been met
sustain the trial court's finding that Owsn- include: (1) undercapitalization of a one*
ah wis defendant's alter ego. "Ordinarily, man corporation; (2) fake to observe cor»
a corporation it regarded as a separate and
<&tiKt legal ent^rfromits stodchoiders.1* idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by
ZTodbtobru ffdferf 29 Utah 2d 3709 510 the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunction
Pid 526,528 (1873). U s is tree whether ing of other officers or directors; (6) ah*
the corporation has many stockholders or sence of corporate records; (7) the use of
only one. fomq i Adams, 4 Kan.the corporation as a facade for operations
Appid 184, 603 Pid 1025, M (1979); of the dominant stockholder or stockholdBm a Kim, 104 MichApp. 700,305 ers;1 and (8) the use of the corporate entiN.W,2d 297,298 (1981). Consequently, the ty in promoting injustice or fraud, jfaflt*
corporate veil which protects stockholders *y I?. Adams, 603 Pid at 1028; Amoco
from individual liability will only be pierced Omvxls ftrp. a Sac*, 222 Kan. 589,
reluctantly and cautiously, hrmj t 567 Pid 1337,134W2 (1977). Setfa
fanimt WW#^514F.Supp.759,
erti lit % McDnlim (k 579 S l i d 76JW4 (Ofarto Rico 1981k JfaflMfr
335,345(TetOvipp.lSf79).
Midtom Convalactnt Hos^ 511 Fiiupp.
[5] To disregard the corporate entity at41W9;Mman&M*351Soid
under the eqmtabk alter ego doctrine, two 210,213-14 (Laipp.1977).

n

circumstances must he shown: (1) Such a [81 The rationale used by courts in perunity of interest and ownership that the mitting the corporate vol to be pierced %
separate personalities of the corporation that if a principal shareholder or owner
and the izniiyiduai no long^ exist, bot the conducts his private and corporate business
corporate is, instead, the alter ego of one on an interchangeable or joint basis u if
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, they were one, he is without standing to
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, complain when an injured party does the
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. same. Bone Constt Co. a Lewit, 148
Nomon v. Jftirraj Firtt Tkrifl t Loan Gaipp.61,250SI2d851,853(1978), In
ft, 596 Pid 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). Ac- Lyons v. Lyons, 340 Soid 450,451 (Alt
cord UnM Stain v, Hedlkm-Midtom Civipp.1976), the court stated that 1a]
Convolmnt Hotp. wt RMlittfion court of equity looks through form to sub*
Cent*, fe, 511 FSupp. 416 (CJ).CaE stance and has oftoi disregarded the corpo*
1981).
fccfoCfsAmGnpa/^ rate form when it wasfictionin fact and
dm, 1st, 562 Pid 1252,1253 (Utah deed and was merely serving the personal
mDochtadtriWo!ktr,WMttuse and convenience of the owner.'* lte
1 Failure to obxrc corporate formalitio in* I Fiilure to distinguish between corpon&e aod
dudesttdactivities t$ coauDeaccnent of hus- personal property, the use of corporate funis to
oes without the isoaoce of sham, lack of pty penooal expenses without proper aocoffli*
shareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of ii^iidfiiiurctomiintimco^
tad financialrecordsare looked upon with <*
by suRaoiden as if they wot partner Rof treme disfavor. Rofa 5S5 i W2i at 772.
la, he f, hnpm Bm. CowfrA 5S5 S.WM
76S,772(TaCivipp.l979).
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Ifts court found a corporation to be a account Although he stated that this <*
shareholder's alter ego, even though he cmred because the bank initiaQy preferred
owned only one share of stock, because he to ded personally with the p r i z ^ l^
eoomingled corporatefondswith his own, cause of Owanah's small net worth, he also
kept no regular corporate records, meet- continued this practice weO after Owanah
ipgs, or mimites tside fmtn a bank account, acquired substutal sssets, becaose, as he
and (fid notfilecorporate income tax re- stated, adjustments m loans and sales of
tarns. See Standee a Standee, 147 stock could be made without time<onsumAriaipp. 473,711 Pid 612,614-15 (1985). ing corporate resolutions.
[9] Former spouses attempting to & September 17, 1976, defendant
shield sssetsftoma courtnriered property pledged 5 0 ^ shares of Western 02 Shale
(fttrilmtion by using a corporate form are rtod and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to
especiaOy kwked upon with judicial disfa- First Security Bank as collateral for bans
mfeflmtys&stalflAriL to Owanah. He testified that this stock
App. 473,711 Pid 612 (1985); Colandm W <*&*&! * « awed in his, his brothn CWmtfm; 401 Aid 480 (HdCtSpec er's, and his broker's names, rather than in
Appj979),
Owanah's name, so that corporate format
T *L
* n ij.1 -k ties could be avoided in seQmg the stock.
In the present case, the trial court con- ni_ . . , . , « - « , . , .
ndend tte evidence in the light of tte Between September 17,1978, and Febnury
-LA. A '2*4 v j • A shares of Cayman stock m ha personal
exsts such a unity of ownership and mter'
£
Mta
est between defendant and Owanah Ofl "
f
P ^ T *
rized
by
hi
s
signature
without
any
sugges(irimtionthatttesejarate,^^
^
f
^
^
j
S
"
^
of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist," and (2) to recognize such tion that he TSS acting on behalf of as/vnj§
separate personalities "would promote in- else.
justice and an inequitable result"
First Security Bank released the 48,000
„
] n.
.. shares of Cayman stock and 47,820 sham
For purposes of appellate review, the t.. m / M . . A , . .. .
AJ.I V J •• • it
i of the Western Ofl Shale stock to defendtnai court's deaswn to pierce the corporate
refl will be upheld if there • substantial
f " ^ ? ? " " ^
.. • / /it • J * oi J this stock as bemg defendants personal
evidence m favor of the judgment Stand^_. . A * . . .. V x L
JM J " ^ M ^ •
m HI Pid at 0 4 4 An exaction ^
of the present trial record indicate that ^ d e n n n t y a ^ e n t t o ^
, A .. .,
. bank from any claim raised by plaintiff
L.
that this stock,
there was substantial evidence supporting Defendant
. , testified
.
' r valby the trial court at $14i5 per share,
the trial court'sfindingthat the separate ued^ ^
personalities of Owanah and defendant no was later sold to fund one of Owanah's
longer existed.
projects, and that the proceedsfromthis
First, defendant ignored corporate for- sale were deposited in Owanah's account
malities. He stated that he preferred to However, payments for defendant's resiconduct corporate business personally, dential mortgage, light and utility bills
rather than in the corporate name, because were also made directly from Owanah's
it was more convenient than observing ap» account, as were numerous cash payments
pnpriaie corporate procedures, and re- to defendant, totalling $22,695i5 within a
Second,diddefendant
peatedly
so. failed to distinguish twelve month period To help SnaDce Ow
bet^corporateandpersonalprop^ rfg ^ ^ M^t ^ ^ ^
hs business dealings.
the parties' Park Citj residence for m*
In correspondence with First Security 000, applied part of the imceeds to a reduc*
Bank, defendant continually referred to the (ion of Owanah's debt, and deposited the
.'-J— :_ n
u.
Owanah checking aceonnt « M« r*w*n««i
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macy. Since defendants not proffer teson his behalf by Owanah as repayment by timony at trial of anyone other than hi*
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, de- self, purporting to have an interest in Royfendant presented no evidence at trial that alty, Owanah, or the Anderson Ranch, it i
he oamtamed any peno&il dieddng ic^ diffieok to fiew this traastetkm u iti|u
count apartfromOwanah's. Personal and thing bnta pemcal tnnsactioQ dooei©.
corponte tf&irs appear to be iaeitricibly der a corporate aegis. Tins, defendant's
equivocal testimony regarding the m *
interwoven
Thai the other officers and directors ship of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with
played little, if any, role in the operation of the lack of substantial evidence that Owandefendant's corporate entities. Defendant ah gave valuable consideration for the pro*
produced no evidence at trial, other than ceeds of the Anderson Ranch sale, supports
his testimony, to indicate that others had afindingthat the corporate shells were
tsy interest in Owtnah, although the trial used as a facade for the transfer of p n ^
judge requested such evidence on several tyfroma corporate shell that pkmtiff had
occasions dnring the trial and the trial was some interest in to one in which she had
less interest
recessed for defendant to provide it
Fourth, there was an almost complete Further, defendant's use of Owanah to
failure to keep and maintain corporate receive the proceeds from the sale of the
records. There was DO evidence that Cayman and Western Oil Company stock,
shareholder records were kept for Cayman coupled with his use of Owanah's account
Corporation, even though such records to pay his personal living expenses, sugwere repeatedly requested by plaintiffs gest that defendant was using Owanah u
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant a facade for his personal affairs.
was even given an opportunity by the court Finally, the use of the corporate entity in
tofindand present thesL Defendant was this circumstance would result in injustice.
similarly unable to produce any records If viewed as legitimate corporate transac*
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or financial status of Royalty Investment Cor- business transactions would convert sub*
poration. Defendant claimed that Owanah stantial assets, which otherwise would be
owned Cayman stock as weB as proceeds regarded as marital property, to corporate
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch, assets in which plaintiff had no interest
which was owned by Royalty Investment Such shielding of assets would result in a
Corporation.
great injustice to plaintiff.
Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and Therefore, wefindthat there was sub*
the other corporate shells were used as a stantial evidence before the trial court to
facade for defendants personal business support itsfindingthat defendant's corpooperations. The most significant evidence rations were actually his alter ego.
was the method in which the Anderson
Ranch sale was consummated. After the
HI
property settlement agreement had been
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation Because application of the alter ego do*
sold the ranch, using no corporate formali- trine is justified, we reach the issue of
ties, and then deposited the sale proceeds whether the property division by the trial
in Owanah's bank account for a # over- court is in harmony with the parties' pity*
riding royalty interest in the Owanah erty settlement agreement Defendant arproject Plaintiff alleged that this wss no gues that the property division resulting,
consideration at al Although the transac- from the alter egofindingis contrary to,
tion was ratified by Royalty on tie advice the intent of the property settlement agi*'<
of counsel eleven months after the sale and ment because it awards plaintiff more thiii^
three days before trial, such a ratification half of the marital estate, and, thus, is ss";
•uv n u f i i w was utvt «&w»v y*] "•*"" UHWJ
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(101 In the division of marital property, corporation fonned during their marriage,
the trial court has wide discretion, and, He alleged that a corporation which the
while the appellate court is not necessarily trial court had determined to be his personbound by its findings, Jhmfm t al, premarital property had loaned S69t000
Jtowpsw, 709 Pid 350,361-62 (Utah to a corporation which he and his wife
1885), thefindingsare presumed valid and formed during the marriage. Because he
fjQ not be disturbed unless the record indi- "utterly failed to prove that the loan did
cates such a manifest injustice or inequity indeed exist," in that he could produce no
as to indicate a dear abuse of discretion, papers documenting the loan, any terms,
EomiEam^WPid395,397(Utah
conditions of repayment, or interest, and
CtApp.1987); Ptttrm t Pttem, 737 because the trial court expressly found
Pid 237,239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regard* that he had commingled corporate and pering challenges to property distributions, sonal funds throughout the marriage so
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that that it could not trace any assets to any
a party seeking reversal of the trial court source, the court found that he had failed
mustproveamisuBdentandingormisap- to carry his burden of proof. Ii at 119.
plication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evi- Wl S"H& *e present defendant
dence clearly preponderated against the has Med to carry his burden of proof that
findings, or that such a serious inequity the disputed assets are corporate rather
resultedfromthe order as to constitute ^ F*®^ P 1 0 ? ^ so wefindno
an abuse of the trial courfs discretion, abuse of discretion in the trial court's propm^tMSm^mmmm erty divisionresultingfrom appiicataoo of
(Utah 1979). That the property (fistribution the alter ego theory.
may not have been mathematically equal is
not sufficient grounds to constitute an
abuse of discretion, since a fair and eq- Defendant further argues that the trial
uitable property distribution is not neces- court's order requiring him to pay plainti
sarJy an equal distribution. Suftetdur m mmi ^^^ a p ^ t ^ 0f
^ ^ , 6 1 5 Pid 1218,1223-24 (Utah the price of the Anderson Ranch sale pro^
ceeds is without support in the findigs,
Further, it is well recognized that a par- conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that
ties' stipulation as to property rights in a the trial judge has wide discretion in the
divorce action, although advisory and division of marital property, and his findusually followed unless the courtfindsit to ings will not be disturbed by an appellate
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessar- court unless the record shows a clear abuse
ily binding on the trial court It is only a of discretion. Hie Utah Supreme Court
recommendation to be adhered to if the has stated, in PtanontPtamn, 561 Pid
court believes it to be fair and reasonable. at 1082, that
Pwrwn v. Panon, 561 Pid 1080,1082 in regard to the matter of the sufficien(Utah 1977); KMmMulk
Pid 472, cy offiiniinpof facU substantial com476 (Utah 1975). Hus, even if the trial pliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of CM
court does not exactly follow the parties' Procedure, is sufficient, andfindinpof
agreement, such a decree is still within the fact and conclusions of law will support a
trial courfs reasonable discretion.
judgment, though they are very general,
The Utah Supreme Court has previously where they in most respects follow the
opheld a trial courfs property division un- allegation of the pleadings. Findings
der somewhat similar circumstances. In should be limited to the ultimate facts
h q i F u t l , 728 Pid 117 (Utah 1986), and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and
the defendant husband appealedfromthe sufficiently conform to the pleadings and
portion of a divorce decree awarding the the evidence to support the judgment,
tit** «ni k*
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though not as full and as complete u continual contact with defendant concern,
ing his failure to mike the accounting aod
might be desired.
had brought a prior lawsuit against defeadfi(wew,^detomineif€qaitywi8(k^
we most have before uaipedfcfindingiof ant to enforce the divorce decree mi
fict pertinent to tiat kroe." h m t agreement Finally, plaintiff stated thtf
she was totally without knowledge of the
business affairs concerning the disputed
assets.
CUpp.1887).
[12] In the present case, tfae trial court
specMyfomKltktlijttlieti^oftk
ptrtief' lgreeoeit, ind until the property
was sold is January 1382, defendant held
title to 62*A% interest in the ranch through
Royalty Investaent Company, The ranch
•as sold for $250,000.00 in January 1982,
and the accounting shows that (fefendant is
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78t125,00,whichis31i5?tof»50,fl0fl.r It
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve
defendant explanation of this property in*
terest Tiere was evidence in the record to
support such afinding,which is sufficient
to come within the guidelines outlined by
Farm and Jom

[13,14] Estoppel arises when there is
(1) a false representation or cooceahnert of
material fads; (2) made with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the facts; (J)
made to a party who is without knowledge
or the means of knowledge of the m l
facts; (4) made with the intention that the
representation be acted upon; and (5) the
party to whom the representation wis
made relied or acted upon it to his prejudke. M y t f . M a n ^ 9 5 U t a h 5 6 0 , 8 8
Pid 731,734 (1938); iforjan & 5ooni (^

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
T.

bbert HOLYOAK, Defendant
and Appellant
N0.8W2M-CA.
Conrt of Appeals of UtaL
Oct 14 m .

Defendant was chargri with p ^
w o f c o o m e lie District Court Utah
Comrt79 Ksy H. Htrdm;, J^ denied defendaotft pretrkl motioQ to soppras and al>
lowed introduction of cocaine into evidence
and defendant was subsequently convicted
Defendant appealed. Hie Court of Appeals, Garft J^ held that defendant failed
to object to admissibility of cocaine evi-

Utah 791

Police, relying oa information provided
by a confidential informant, obtained a
search warrant to search Hop/oak's premies forcocaine. As aresultof the search,
they found a small plastic big containing
cocaine hidden under HoJyoak's water bed
Prior to trial,flotyoakmoved to suppress
the admission of the cocaine on pounds
that the confidential informant's veracity
and basis of knowledge were inadequate,
that corroboration of his information was
defective, as was the police affidavit based
on the informant's testimony, and, therefore, that there wis insufficwxt pn*abk
cause to issue the search warrant Holyoak moved altoBitiweJy for dkdosnre of
the informant's identity or for the court to
coriud an in w m m interview of the
WoniMt on the theory that to was, in
reality, no confidential informant, but that
the police officer hadfehricatedthe affidavit and had planted the cocaine.

See dso City of Mercer liknd a SUi*
^na,9WaslLApp.479,513PidS0,8
(1973). If any of these elements an ma*
ing, there can be no estoppel Kittf a
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
£ M 8 3 P i d a t 7 3 4 . Further, estop,
award with respect to the Andmon Ranch
pel cannot be inferred from facts of wind
property.
the party to be estopped had no knowledge.
(Trover u C^im, 23 Utah 2d 441^ 464 P^d
598,602(1970).
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal
is whether plaintiff was estopped from de[15] Estoppel is not applicable under
nying that he furnished an adequate acthe present facta
counting, He alleges that he made an oral
accounting to the law firm of Roe and The judgment of the trial court is if*
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler firmed. Costs to plaintiff,

denes at trial, and hence, could not raise A suppression heart? was held, and
even though testimony indicated that some
issue on
of the allegations in the police affidavit
were false, the trial court denied afl of
Holyoak's motions. Regarding the motion
to
suppress, the trial court stStted that the
Criminal Law <=W1(3)
affidavit, viewed in its entirety, supported
Defendant failed to object to admissithe issuance of the search warrant
bility of cocaine evidence at trial, and
hence, he could not raise on appeal issue At trial, the cocaine was introduced into
challenging denial of motion to suppress, evidence. Holyoak did not object to its
introduction, and ^was convicted by a jury
of possession of cocaine.
James G. Clark Provo, for defendant On appeal, Holyoak raises substantially
and appellant
the same issues as in the evidentiary hear*

all the stock certificates in the parties' safe
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later re- BILLINGS and JACKSON, fl,
turned some of these certificates to defoxt concur.
ant Defendant argues that he acted in
reasonablerelianceupon express <y implied
representations that the accounting was
satisfactory because defendant made no
(o taiMNrc**)
further demand for an accounting after
this event However, the document which
defendant received from Roe and Fowler
when it returned the coiificates wis only
an acknowledgement that the shares were
delivered into his control as president of
Qwanah, rather than a release or exclusion
of the shires from an ereototl accounting.

David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., ing: (1) Should the cocaine obtained pursuSandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty, Gen, for ant to the search warrant have been suppressed on grounds that there was no probplaintiff and respondent
able cause to support the search warrant?
(2) Alternatively, should the trial court
Before GAM, BILLINGS and
have ordered disclosure of the identity of
GREENWOOD, JJ.
the confidential informant! (3) As a further alternative to suppressing the eviOPINION
dence or disclosing the identity of the inforGARPF, Judge:
mant, should the court have conducted an
m canm interview of the informant?
bis conviction of possession of cocaine, a Our review of these questions, however,
-thW degree felony, on the grounds that depends upon whether these issues were
the tzisl court failed to suppress evidence preserved for appeal Although Holyoak
f a n a l W y moved to suppress the cocaine prior to tri-
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of the contrary view taken by my four colleagues, I suppose it can reasonably be
said that there is at least some doubt that
the statute should be construed and applied
as I have stated above. If that be so, then
under the rule which requires taxing statutes to be interpreted and applied liberally
in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against
the taxing authority, the issue can be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.

proved and recorded, or that insurer negligently failed to disclose the fact that properties involved were not approved building
lots.
Affirmed.

County, Ray Van Cott, Jr., J., dismissing
vendees' second amended complaint with
prejudice, vendees appealed. The Supreme
Court, Callister, J., held that vendors' exhibition of unapproved subdivision plat to
vendees, without informing vendees that
such plat had not been approved, was not
negligent misrepresentation, and complaints
of vendees were insufficient to maintain
claims that vendors induced the purchase
of the lots in question by fraudulently misrepresenting that the plat had been ap-

6. Fraud <§=>I3(3)
Liability will only lie for a negligent
misrepresentation when there is a special
duty of care running from the representor
to the representee.

1. Negligence <&=>6
In some instances, negligence may be
predicated upon violation of an ordinance
or statute.
It seems to me unfair and inequitable 2. Municipal Corporations <§=>43
that Utah should bear the entire cost of the
Statutes making it unlawful for anyone
cooperative examination by giving the tax- to sell a subdivision lot unless subdivision
payer credit against its tax, when its bene- plat has been approved and recorded impose
fits also have value to the other states par- *a duty running to the sovereign, and violaticipating in the examination* In view of tion thereof does not necessarily give rise
the decision of the majority, if the situa- to civil liability. U.CJU953, 17-27-21, 57tion is changed, it must be done by legis- 5-5.
lation*
3. Fraud <§=>27
Vendors' exhibition of unapproved
subdivision plat to vendees without informing them that such plat had not been approved was not negligent misrepresentation!
U.C.A.1953, 17-27-21, 57-5-5.
13 Utah 2d 279
4. Fraud <§=»4
Keith B. ELLIS et al- Plaintiffs
Usual action for fraud, whether negliand Appellants,
gent or intentional, requires that a reprer
v.
sentatiorr be made with the intention that
Karl B. HALE et aU Defendants and
it be relied on.
Respondents.
5. Fraud <§=>I3(3)
No. 9537.
Negligent misrepresentation differs
Supreme Court of Utah.
from intentional misrepresentation in that
July 12, 1962.
in the former the representor makes an affirmative assertion which is false without
Action for damages arising out of having used reasonable diligence or compereal estate transactions. From an order of tence in ascertaining the verity of the as. »
the Third District Court of Salt Lake sertion.

7. Fraud <§=>I3(3)
There can be no liability for negligence
in the manner of expression.
8. Fraud <§=»42
Complaint which did not show that
vendor, who made alleged misrepresenta-

ELLIS v. HALE

Utah

383

Cite as 373 P.2d 382

o another, intended that such misrepitions would be transmitted to venas insufficient to state cause of action
mdulent misrepresentations. U.C.A.
7-27-21, 57-5-5.
id <§=>29

a person fraudulently makes a misentation of facts to another with the
that it will be transmitted to a third
, the latter may have cause of action
t the misrepresentor.

l4

- Covenants <3=>3
Warranties, other than the five embraced in the statutory warranty deed,
should be stated in a deed with clarity.

Adam M. Duncan, Ronald N. Boyce, Salt
Lake City, for appellants.
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen, Backman,
Backman & Clark, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

CALLISTER, Justice.
Action for damages arising out of certain real estate transactions. From an order of the lower court dismissing their
second amended complaint, with prejudice,
plaintiffs appeal.
stud <§=>46
The complaint which we are asked to relaim by vendees, against insurers for
view is rather lengthy and complex, to say
ence in failing to disclose that insured
the least. As best we can determine, the
ere in unapproved subdivision failed
facts alleged are as follows:
complaint contained no allegation
The defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher
isurers knew that vendees were acting
were
the owners of a certain parcel of
impression that lots were within apreal
property
in Salt Lake County. In the
i subdivision,
forepart of 1959, these defendants caused
sadlng <8=>354<22)
the parcel to be surveyed and subdivided
laim by vendees, who purchased lots into four lots.1 A subdivision plat was preL in unapproved subdivision plat, that pared, designated as "Mount Olympus Park
was breach of provisions of title in- No. 5." The plat was submitted to the
:e policy issued by insurers was prop- Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning
lismissed where the policy was not Commission who refused to approve and acned in the record and the particular cept it because there had not been com>ion or provisions claimed to have pliance with a county ordinance relating
^reached were not set out in the com- to subdividing which requires lots of a larg. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-21, 57-5-5; er area, installation of curbs, gutters, sideof Civil Procedure, rule 8(a).
walks, etc 2 There is a general allegation
that all of the defendants were acting as
>venants <8»I7, M4(!)
Ascription of land by the word "lot" partners or joint adventurers in these real
3t indicate a promise of vendors that estate transactions and all had knowledge
lots were in approved subdivision, and of the rejection of the subdivision plan.
It is also alleged that "during the spring
that there was breach of warranty
e failed where complaint contained no of 1959" the defendants Hale, Elders and
tion that sale of lot in unapproved Fisher conveyed to defendants Barrett
rision was prohibited by law. U.C.A. three lots identified upon the subdivision
plat as Lots 1, 2 and 3, and that "in July
17-27-21, 57-5-5.
tud <£=**!
raudulent misrepresentation comwhich did not reveal any allegation
.representation made to vendees was
aent.

appears from the record and the
aplaint, however, that in October, 1958,
Hales had evidently divided the par• because they executed separate deeds,

four in all, to Elders, Fishers, and two
others to portions of the parcel.
2. Title 9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1953.
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and August 1959" the Barretts conveyed, '
by warranty deeds, these three lots to the
plaintiffs Duncan.
Following the foregoing, the complaint
alleges that on July 7, 1959, the defendants
Hale and Elders conveyed, by warranty
deed, Lot 1 to the Duncans, and on the same
date, the Hales and the defendants Fisher,
by like conveyance, conveyed Lot 2 to the
Duncans, By warranty deed, dated August
7, 1959, the Hales and Barretts conveyed
Lot 3 to the Duncans.3 These last three
mentioned deeds described the property
conveyed by lot number and by metes and.
bounds* The metes and bounds descriptions
coincided with the lots as they appeared on
the plat. No mention of "Mount Olympus
Park No. 5" was contained in these deeds*
On January 27, 1960, 'the defendants
Elders executed a warranty deed to the
plaintiffs Ellis. While this deed did not
contain a lot number, the metes and bounds
description conformed to Lot 4 of the subdivision plot.
The Duncans "conveyed or agreed to
convey" their interest in the lots to the
plaintiffs Hepworth and Burton, _but" are
unable to complete the conveyance because
of defendants' noncompliance with the ordinance. It is then alleged that the impossibility of securing building permits from
the county has caused plaintiffs damage.
The complaint sets forth eight claims,
revolving about essentially five asserted
causes of action. These causes are: (1)
defendants were negligent in violating a
statutory standard of care and in exhibiting or causing to be exhibited to plaintiffs the subdivision plat without informing them that it had not been approved; (2)
defendants induced the purchase of the lots
3« While impossible of precise ascertainment
from the allegations of the complaint, it
is a reasonable inference that these deeds
were later in time than the deeds from
the Barretts to the Duncans.
4. It is doubtful that this ordinance has any
application since it defines "subdivision"
as a division of a tract of land into five
or more lots. (9-1-2, Rev.Ord.SX.Co.,

by fraudulently misrepresenting that the
plat had been approved and recorded; (3)
defendants Backman negligently failed to
disclose the fact that the properties involved
were not approved building lots; (4) the
title insurance policy was bleached; an<J
(5) there was a breach of the warranty of
title.
[1,2] (1) Plaintiffs argue that the defendants, in selling the lots, violated the
provisions of the county ordinance 4 afore?
mentioned and our state statutes.5 It is true
that in some instances negligence may be
predicated upon the violation of an ordinance or statute.6 However, the laws htri
involved have as their object the intelligent and orderly development of the con£
munity, and, to effectuate this purpose}
criminal sanctions were imposed* They
were not enacted to promote safety, an4
they do not attempt to lay down rujejj
regulating the conduct of individuals ixfr
ter se. Their purpose is to impose, a.di^tjf
running to the sovereign, and a violation;
thereof does not necessarily give rise,^
civil liability,
[3] With respect to the claim that the
defendants exhibited or caused to beve2&j
hibited the plat without informing plain^
tiffs that it had not • been approved^ the
plaintiffs maintain that this amounted to a,
negligent misrepresentation. This clainj
was properly dismissed The gravamen^
the claim is that defendants are liable fog
negligently using a mode of communication
which they ought to have foreseen, woul#
be interpreted by the plaintiffs as an indication that the lots involved were a l>art
of an approved subdivision.
bib
[4-6] The usual action for - fraudt
whether negligent or intentional, requires,
1953). The instant tract was divided into^ .j s
only four lots.
5. 17-27-21 and 57-5-5, TJ.OA.1953. These-^
statutes make it unlawful; and provide'a
misdemeanor penalty for anyone selling
a subdivision lot unless* the subdivision •*,
has been approved and recorded r tAO *
6. cf. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn1 Schoofa Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 177 P.2d 279. " "*
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t a representation be made with the intion that it be relied on.7 Negligent
representation differs from intentional
representation in that in the former the
resentor makes an affirmative assertion
ch is false without having used reaable diligence or competence in ascering the verity of the assertion.8 Morer, liability will only lie for a negligent
representation when there is a special
y of care running from the representor
he representee.9
7] In plaintiffs' complaint it is specifiy alleged that the defendants had knowle of the falsity of the supposed repretation that induced the belief that the
were part of an approved subdivision.
conclude that this knowledge fore>es an action for negligent misrepretation, unless it can be said that deiants might be liable for the manner
Jieir communication, rather than in the
srtainment of the verity of the comiication. Under the facts of this case,
such liability can be recognized. The
ties were dealing at arm's length,
•e was no special duty between them
ing out of a special expertise or corni c e on the part of one of the par, and the plaintiffs could have very
ly cleared up whatever ambiguity or
Ivocalness there was in the communions by the easy expedient of a simple
stion. The inherent ambiguity of most
ns of communication compel us to the
elusion that usually, as a matter of law,
e can be no liability for negligence in
.manner of expression. Obviously, if
erson intentionally uses equivocal or
>iguous language with the hope that
1 of several meanings will be underdo by the representee, an entirely difnt situation would be presented. But,
e these facts are not pleaded, we need
address ourselves to that problem.
31ar v. Bd. o£ Trade, 164 CaLApp.2d 636,
31 P.2d 89; Courteen Sud Co. v. Hong
^ong & Shanghai Bkg. Corp., 245 N.Y.
77, 157 N.E. 272, 56 A.L.R. 1186.
373 p 2d—25

[8,9] (2) Plaintiffs contend that their
complaint states a cause of action based
upon fraudulent misrepresentation in that
the defendants exhibited or caused to be
exhibited to plaintiffs the subdivision plat
and represented to them that it had been
approved although they knew otherwise.
However, it is specifically alleged that the
defendant Karl B. Hale made the misrepresentation to the defendant, Roy A.
Barrett, and that the latter repeated the
same to plaintiff, Adam A. Duncan, If a
person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of facts to another with the intent that
it will be transmitted to a third person, the
latter may have a cause of action against
the misrepresentor.10 The instant complaint fails to allege that Hale intended
the misrepresentation to be transmitted
to Duncan or anyone else and must, therefore, fail.
[10] The claim of fraud by plaintiffs
Ellis must also fail. They received their
deed directly from the Elders. A search of
the complaint fails to reveal any allegation
of a misrepresentation made to them.
[11] (3) Plaintiffs Burton contend
that the Backmans, in issuing to them an
"interim insurance binder" and title insurance policy, were negligent in failing
to disclose in these instruments the fact,
of which the Backmans had knowledge,
that the lots were located in a disapproved
subdivision. The complaint contains no
allegation that the Backmans knew that
the Burtons were acting under an impression that the lots were within an approved subdivision and the Backmans had
no duty to reveal facts outside the scope
of the transaction. The lower court properly dismissed this claim.
[12] (4) The Burtons also claim that
there was a breach of the provisions of the
title insurance policy issued by the Backmans. The policy is not contained in the
8. 1 Harper & James, the Law of Torts,
Sec. 7.6.
9. Ibid.
10. Rest of Torts, Section 533.
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record before us, and the particular provision or provisions claimed to have been
breached are not set out in the complaint
This claim does not meet the requirements
of our rules 1X and was properly dismissed.
• [13] (5) Finally, the Duncans contend
that there was a breach of warranty of title in the deeds received by them to Lots 1,
2 and 3. It is alleged that the parties to
these deeds understood the word "lot" to
mean building lots in an approved subdivision. The lots were conveyed by use of the
short form warranty deed.~ In their brief
the Duncans argue that the warranties of
good right to convey and seisin were breached. Whatever force this argument may
have, by virtue of the fact that Section 1727-21, U.CA.1953 prohibits the sale of
lots in an unapproved subdivision, it is not
properly before the court since the complaint contains no allegation to that effect. In fact, the*, complaint does not rely
on any of the five warranties embraced in
the statutory warranty deed.
• [14] Duncans' theory apparently is that
by using the word "lot" the defendants
warranted that the properties were part of
an approved, subdivision. This is not sustainable. Warranties, other than the five
embraced in a statutory warranty deed,
should be stated in a deed with clarity.
Description of land by the use of the word
"lot" does not indicate a promise on the
part of the defendant vendors in this case.
Although such a description might possibly
be probative of fraud, it cannot as a matter of law be considered a warranty. These
claims were properly dismissed.
No discussion is contained in this opinion with regard to the possible claims
against the defendants Barrett. It appears from the record that no appearance
was made by them in the court below or in
this court.
The order of dismissal with prejudice is
affirmed. Costs awarded to defendants.
WADE, C. J., and HENRIOD, McDONOUGH, and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

13 Utah 2d 285
Paul RUBEY and Carol Rubey, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Morris T, WOOD and Ruby J. Wood, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants,
No. 9447.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 20, 1962.
Action for specific performance of real
estate contract. The Third District Court';
Salt Lake County, Aldon J. Anderson, J.,
rendered judgment on directed verdict foe
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The,'
Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that
evidence was insufficient to take to jury
question whether defendants had been jus*
tified in relying on plaintiffs' oral representations as to contents of contract
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <§=>987(3)

Supreme Court had duty to review both"
questions of law and fact in equitable easel
2. Contracts <&=>99(3)
To overturn written contract by claim'
of fraud and misrepresentation, evidence^
must be clear and convincing.
3. Appeal and Error <§=>l 012(1)

For defendants to succeed on appeal*
from judgment denying their claim of fraudf
and misrepresentation, evidence must clears?
ly preponderate against trial courr/s decit*
sion.
4. Specific Performance <§=>I23

Evidence, in action for specific" per"
formance of real estate contract, wherein,
defendants charged fraud and misrepresent
tation, was insufficient to take to jury ques5^
tion whether defendants had been justified;
in relying on plaintiffs' oral representations,
as to contents of contract.

Cayias, Day & Livingston, Salt Lake
City, for appellants.

II. UJt.C.P. 8(a).

